Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia

Literary metaphors and the hope of social renewal

2024-10-07T08:06:45-03:00

This work discusses some aspects of literary metaphors in Richard Rorty’s philosophy. This is a bibliographical investigation focused on some specific moments of Rorty’s philosophical production, specifically, in the works

Contingency, irony and solidarity (2007) and Essays on Heidegger et al. (1999a). Works and articles by interpreters who address topics of ethics, political philosophy and social philosophy in Rorty’s thinking were consulted as supporting literature, such as Malachowski (2002) and Schulenberg (2015). In this context, Rorty proposes a practical use for literary metaphors as an element that promotes individual and social changes, as they suggest, through imagination, alternative ethical, political and social scenarios, in addition to inspiring specific redescriptive changes for the descriptions of individuals and your community.

Beliefs by contagion

2025-10-29T14:21:53-03:00

The Peircean discussion on the modes of fixing belief remains relevant in the contemporary informational landscape, in which digital networks occupy a central role in the production and circulation of content. However, the criteria that once ensured the reliability of scientific beliefs—such as the continuity of experience, empirical testing, and community scrutiny—have been increasingly replaced by immediate social validation processes grounded in speed, repetition, and information virality. In this article, we analyze the phenomenon we call belief transmission by contagion, understood as an emerging mode of belief reproduction in environments mediated by digital platforms. To this end, we revisit the concept of belief in Peirce’s pragmatism and situate it within the semiotic context of networks. We then describe the triadic structure underlying the dynamics of this contagion, articulated through the meme–network–belief relation: the meme as an iconic element, the network as an index, and belief as a symbol understood as a general rule of action. We demonstrate that this form of dissemination does not result from engagement with facts, but rather from the community and algorithmic dynamics that simulate scientific inquiry while undermining the formation of habits responsive to reality. Finally, we argue for the need to promote, in digital environments, modes of belief circulation that recover the cooperative and investigative principles of the scientific method, so that rationality may also become the object of a contagion oriented toward the growth of experience and the ideal of truth.

Imagination as political category

2024-12-02T15:00:54-03:00

The concept of imagination has not figured as a primary category in political theory, where terms such as “power”, “freedom”, “justice”, and even “rights” usually receive most of our efforts and attention. A notable exception, though far from unique, is the importance attributed to this concept by the jurist and philosopher Roberto Mangabeira Unger. This article discusses the uses of the idea of imagination in Unger’s work, especially in

The Self Awakened, book where the author explores his idea of “unbounded pragmatism”, highlighting the consequences of employing the idea of imagination for political theorizing, as well as the limits and possible criticisms of the author, such as the voluntarism of his theory and his negligence of the established power relations in society.

Contributions of Peircean philosophy to contemporary debates on disinformation

2025-02-10T14:39:09-03:00

This text aims to theoretically explore how Peirce’s philosophy can serve as a basis for conceptualizing and explaining everyday practices understood as disinformation. We begin with a review of the Brazilian literature on the contributions of Peircean philosophy to the phenomenon of disinformation. We then situate our position as inspired by the normative theoretical proposal of Peircean semiotics. However, we argue that addressing disinformation events requires the addition of descriptive elements, which were not at the center of interest of Peircean philosophy. In light of this, we will examine two philosophical aspects that are important to a Peircean approach to disinformation: (1) the semiotic theory of information, seen as part of Peirce's normative account on the ideal development of semiosis; and (2) the fixation of beliefs, where we focus on the three non-scientific ways of settling a doubt and a belief. We argue that what is understood as disinformation in the current digital culture is a set of practices that, in general terms, deviate from the demands of systematic critical inquiry and function as deviations in the normal course of semiosis.

Peirce’s more-than-human philosophy, its precursors, and its heirs

2025-02-12T09:56:38-03:00

The article discusses the more-than-human or extra-human aspects of Charles S. Peirce's semiotic philosophy, contextualizes it in the history of ideas (Aristotle, the medievals, Montaigne, Descartes), examines its foundations, its similarities and differences in relation to the trends of the 21st century in cultural and philosophical studies in the context of the dichotomies and anthropocentrism inherited from Western culture which are nowadays denounced by post-humanism, non-human studies, Object-Oriented Ontology and the more-than-human paradigm.

The contemporary relevance of Peirce’s philosophy in relation to artificial intelligence

2024-12-09T19:45:07-03:00

The proliferation of Artificial Intelligences, now an umbrella term for a broad array of interrelated technologies, has fostered a climate of insecurity. Beyond the predictive nature of several technologies, which generate hypotheses for human decisions, the generative aspect of using LLMs has been added, thriving immature, questionable, and prone to ethical concerns. Socially, there is great enthusiasm about the potential progress these advancements might bring, alongside significant apprehension regarding the potential misuse of this technological turning. Both perspectives are legitimate. Consequently, a great deal of misinformation clouds the reasonable assessment of just “how big” AI is. In this article, we take a step back to question how the tool aligns with emotions and, more importantly, with the semiotic relationships and inferences that can arise from its outcomes. In the introduction, by establishing new boundaries for ethics, we reflect on its contemporary position as a branch of philosophy. In the second section, as concisely as possible, we attempt to clarify how artificial intelligence operates, and then we explore the risks and potential dysfunctions of the tool. Finally, in the conclusion, we present elements that highlight the contemporaneity of Peirce's philosophy in reference to generative artificial intelligence.

The role of conversation, inquiry, and deliberation in problem-solving

2025-01-16T17:46:50-03:00

Problems are generally defined as barriers to goals. Consequently, it is a form of practical reasoning, understood as figuring out the means by which such barriers are to be removed. The general form of practical reasoning suggests three processes that would be involved in problem-solving. The first is coming to an understanding of the problem, which involves the process of conversation. The second is a matter of inquiry – figuring out the practical hypotheses, the means of solving the problem. Since problem-solving requires cooperation of others, it also requires deliberation among those affected by a problem as to which of the practical hypotheses will work best, ending in some agreement. Using the work of pragmatists, such as Peirce, James, Dewey, Addams, Wallace, Kitcher, among others, the aim of the article is to show a normative framework for each of these processes that can best lead to effective problem solving.

Straying from the pragmatic ground of natural intelligence

2025-07-11T14:59:04-03:00

We are in the vestibule of an era when Artificial Intelligence seems destined not only to manage, but to govern, the flow and use of information. Because the impact on human life and culture will surely be profound, it is imperative that the conception of intelligence that guides AI is conformable to human intelligence. Neuroscientist and AI developer, Jeffrey Hawkins, is convinced that AI is on the wrong path with its reliance on large language (big data) models, and that to achieve Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), the near-universal goal of AI developers, a biologically-inspired approach is needed. He has developed a promising new natural theory of intelligence based on the functioning of the human neocortex, but he dismisses old brain processes as mainly unnecessary and counter-productive for post-Darwinian AI. The naturalist conception of intelligence developed by the classical pragmatists a century and a half ago, provides a richer theoretical framework of intelligence that situates intelligent agents in interactive environments, the pragmatic ground of natural intelligence. Peirce, in particular, with his life-long quest to deeply understand how knowledge can be gleaned from experience, developed theories of perception, belief formation, semiosis, and cognitive logic, which taken together constitute the basis for a comprehensive theory of intelligence that incorporates instinctive and emotional intelligence and that allows for a conceptual space where thought can be focused on complex theoretical, normative, and aesthetic concerns and interests. This pragmatic account of intelligence, of mentality in general, is necessary for understanding the limitations and risks of AI as it rushes to develop AGI.

"If we conceptualize badly, we politicize badly" and emptying the concept of "freedom" in visual translations

2024-12-02T15:50:02-03:00

We observe postmodernity dealing with concepts as adversaries to be stripped of contours in pursuit of an ideal of fluidity – the result of this abstraction is vagueness. However, conceptualization finds roots in Peircean pragmatism; that is, in the applicability of ideas to reality. Emptying fundamental concepts in favor of scattered subjectivities complicates communication, which tends to increase depoliticization. Here, we bring the quote from philosopher Celia Amorós that composes the title. We acknowledge that conceptualizing is an important reference for understanding. It's a way to comprehend our environment, and denying it only increases suffering in the process of understanding ourselves in the world. Learning to give contours to terms and continued ideas is also recognizing oneself in language, making possible the sharing of sign systems, something essential for communication to occur; after all, individuals' repertoires must intersect to enable dialogue (Torres, 2006, p. 105). Based on the assumption that this emptying is reflected in visual communication, influencing our repertoire and consequently how we propagate ideas, we turn our attention to images that seek to represent a polysemic, familiar concept subjected to many twists: freedom, around rhetorical patterns, using keyword research on image search platforms. We begin the article addressing the function of concepts as a counterpoint to the ideal of vagueness and, especially, their importance in communication and design, marking one of the initial points of the creative process. We explore some of the senses that the term "freedom" carries: etymologically, in philosophy, politics, sociology. Next, we move to the collection of graphic images, book covers, and iconographies. Finally, we verbalize what each image tends to portray in order to classify them and compare them with the information gathered about the concept of "freedom," organizing the results in tables of rhetorical patterns. Through this screening and subsequent comparison of results, pairing them with some of the senses identified, we indicate how the emptying of the concept can be reflected in its visual translations, influencing our critical capacity, and how Peirce's pragmatic maxim can assist us in the production and interpretation of symbolic visual signs; that is, in the signification of concepts, the object of pragmatic analysis. We compare some senses of freedom and their intersemiotic translation to evaluate the semantic openness that tends to be incorporated. In a deeper sense, we seek to perceive in the subtleties of repetitions the tendencies of emptying and tensioning of language and address crucial conceptual points in an unconcerned and uncritical manner, complicating the development around certain terms and ideas.

The (im)possibility of replacing the judge with artificial intelligence applications

2024-12-14T14:39:44-03:00

This article examines predictions of the replacement of natural justice by applications of artificial intelligence, with an emphasis on the pragmatic perspective. The research highlights the technical and ethical obstacles involved in this replacement, such as the restrictions of Artificial Intelligence in relation to moral understanding, impartiality and contextualization of decisions. Even though AI can be used as auxiliary tools in the legal system, human interpretation is still irreplaceable due to its complexity and depth. The study concludes that the figure of the judge, with his capacity for empathy and critical reflection, continues to be essential for the search for justice.

A guess at the Schultes riddle

2025-01-28T08:35:26-03:00

Between 1941 and 1953, Richard Evans Schultes, considered the foremost figure in ethnobotany, conducted extensive field research among indigenous communities in the Colombian, Peruvian, and Brazilian Amazon. During this period, he cataloged over 1,200 new botanical species and deeply investigated the cultural and medicinal uses of plants with consciousness-altering potential. His main area of study focused on Banisteriopsis Caapi, a native vine used in the preparation of Ayahuasca. In a 1986 article, Schultes reported a puzzling mystery: how could indigenous informants identify, from a distance and without hesitation, the chemotype of different variants of this species? In this paper, we examine Schultes’ enigma from the perspective of the philosophy of cognition, particularly through the contributions of Kant and Peirce. We propose an investigative framework that, through the analysis of key concepts from these two philosophers' proposals, allows us to speculate on possible hypotheses for solving the enigma. Along this framework, we consider different approaches to human cognition, aesthetics, the possibilities of cognitive expansion through biological artifacts, and the divergences and convergences of different epistemological conceptions. In conclusion, we propose that, in the context analyzed, Ayahuasca may have been used by Amerindian natives as a cognitive artifact with the potential to enhance perceptual abilities. Thus, in our approach, Schultes’ enigma reveals itself not only as an ethnobotanical challenge but as a gateway to investigating broader questions about human knowledge and its possibilities.

Mechanisms and inference to the best explanation

2025-01-28T09:01:05-03:00

Non-deductive inferences do not imply certainty; however, they are paramount on science (for induction, probabilistic reasoning and inference of the best explanation). Paul Thagard attempted to develop a notion – the notion of mechanisms – in order to show that, although they do not guarantee certainty, they can mitigate the problems suggested by a non-deductive approach by contributing to the understanding of the possible causes of a phenomenon. This paper deals with Thagard's concept of mechanisms concerning inference to the best explanation.

Epistemic acceptability of indicative conditionals in Igor Douven

2025-01-28T08:30:35-03:00

Acceptability designates justified or rational believability. In the much-disputed theoretical field on conditionals, the acceptability conditions of conditionals is one of the few topics where some consensus has been reached. Discussing the acceptability conditions of conditionals is to state under which circumstances it is epistemically appropriate to hold a conditional belief. One of the most widely accepted interpretations among philosophers is that the acceptability of a conditional follows from its respective conditional probability. This is one possible reading of E. W. Adams’s thesis, originally formulated as a theory of the assertability of conditionals. In philosophical literature, it is not uncommon to find those who defend the descriptive correctness of Adams's thesis, which implies the correctness of the acceptability conditions entailed by it. For I. Douven, this defense is mistaken, as its rejection can be supported by empirical findings. Results from experimental studies conducted by him and S. Verbrugge suggest that neither Adams’s original thesis nor some of its weakened versions found in the literature are descriptively accurate. This does not imply that the acceptability of conditionals cannot be framed in probabilistic terms; rather, it suggests that the available probabilistic theses require adjustments to establish more accurate descriptive conditions for acceptability. This paper aims to review epistemic theories of conditionals, particularly Adams’s thesis considering the experimental results obtained by Douven and Verbrugge. Accordingly, what is sought is a reflection on the role empirical approaches might assume within the philosophical theorization at hand.

Naturalizando a lógica

2025-01-28T08:46:52-03:00

Este artigo naturaliza a inferência indutiva, indicando como o conhecimento científico de mecanismos reais proporciona grandes benefícios para essa forma de inferência. Apresento a ideia de que o conhecimento sobre mecanismos contribui para a generalização, para a inferência da melhor explicação, para a inferência causal e para o raciocínio probabilístico. Partindo da ideia de que alguns A são B, uma generalização de que todos A são B se torna mais plausível quando um mecanismo conecta A e B. A inferência da melhor explicação é fortalecida quando as explicações empregam mecanismos e quando as hipóteses explicativas são elas próprias explicadas por meio de mecanismos. As inferências causais na explicação médica, no raciocínio contrafactual e por meio da analogia também se beneficiam de conexões por meio de mecanismos, os quais também auxiliam em problemas relativos à interpretação, disponibilidade e cálculo de probabilidades.

Review

2025-03-20T15:41:35-03:00

in his book, Projects of mathematization of logic: from Raimundo Lúlio to Giuseppe Peano, Rafael da Silva da Silveira traces the development of mathematical logic, focusing on the creation of modern symbolic notation used since the 19th century. He argues that this was not just a minor change but a major scientific revolution, highlighting key figures and their contributions to this field. In this review, my aim is to show some of the book’s merits and some of its flaws as well, especially the exclusion of Charles S. Peirce from its scope and some of its consequences.

Presentation

2025-01-30T17:03:11-03:00

This number of the journal Cognitio is dedicated to Charles S. Peirce’s logic. In its broadest sense, logic is understood by Peirce as semiotics, “the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiotics; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer” (EP II, 413). Even in its narrowest sense, taken as a study of the validity of deductive inferences and its components, logic is still too vast. In the middle between these two limits (between generality and particularity) lies a huge variety of continuous topics on logic. The articles collected in this number are precisely samples of that variety and this is the reason why the reader can find here articles that, for instance, are not only dealing with the distinction between collective and general signs, but also with three-valued logic or modal logic.

Collective signs and generality in the trichotomy of the dynamic object in Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics

2025-01-24T08:49:54-03:00

According to Peirce, generality has a distributive character, that is, the character of a law that can be applied to anything that may exist in a class, without asserting whether there is anything or what that thing is, but providing a description of how the individuals of that class should be selected (EP 2:284, 1903). Rodrigues (2017) asserts that Peirce does not regard the generality expressed in universal quantifiers as having a collective character, in the sense of signifying a particular singular group, a given collection. In 1905, Peirce (EP 2:352-353) stated that “a collective term is singular, since it denotes a given group and a given collection”. In 1908, however, Peirce used the term “collective” to describe the class of signs that have a dynamic object of thirdness, which is the category of generality. But he also employs the term “distributive” to describe the class of signs that have an immediate object of thirdness. Thus, in his descriptions of the ten trichotomies, the terms “collective” and “distributive” are used when Peirce wants to describe the mode of being of thirdness, i.e., that of generality. Although Peirce denied that generality has a collective character in the case of logical quantifiers, he considered using the term “collective” to describe the generality of dynamic objects. Consequently, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of the term “collective” when applied to thirdness in the trichotomy of the dynamic object. This is precisely the purpose of this article, which begins by presenting the problem of using this terminology in semiotics and the notions of collective and distributive in semantics and philosophy. Then, it shows how the terms appear in the texts in which Peirce conceives the ten trichotomies and focuses on the use of the term “collective” in two letters, one to William James, from 1909, and the other to the English logician P. E. B. Jourdain, from 1908. Starting from those two letters, we present the relationship between the term “collective” and the notion of continuity that culminates in the distinction between finite and enumerable collections and infinite and innumerable collections, suggesting that the notion of collective in the dynamic object has the meaning of an infinite and innumerable collection, associating the notion of dynamic object with the notion of continuum.

Three-valued logic and paraconsistency in Peirce

2022-02-25T15:11:25-03:00

Peirce is now recognized as one of the pioneers of mathematical and algebraic logic, but his original work on non-classical logic still receives little attention outside the narrow circle of Peirce scholars. This is particularly evident in his development of the three-valued propositional calculus, recorded in Peirce’s Logic Notebook more than a decade before the rise of many-valued logics. The triadic logic, as named by Peirce, was formalized by Turquette in the late 1960s. Turquette presented an axiomatic interpretation of the three-valued tables in a series of articles that have since become a cornerstone in such studies. Recently, I have proposed a new approach, emphasizing a non-explosive fragment of triadic logic. This paper aims to expand the research in the following points: (i) a critical analysis of Turquette’s works, including the discussion of the Rosser-Turquette method of axiomatization; and (ii) the reconstruction of a fragment of the triadic logic in a system based on Sobociński’s material implication, formalized in sequent calculus. I conclude that Peirce’s three-valued matrix induces a paraconsistent, relevant, and substructural logic with investigative potential for contemporary research in non-classical logics.

Peirce and the liar’s logic

2023-03-30T19:13:32-03:00

This paper discusses two treatments given by Charles Sanders Peirce to the Liar paradox, establishing connections with the current debate on the subject. In the Harvard Lectures of 1865, Peirce considers that the Liar proposition is both true and false, which, according to his view of logic, renders the proposition meaningless. This treatment partially anticipates the contemporary dialetheistic position, which considers that the Liar is an evidence that some propositions are both true and false. In later texts, Peirce revises his treatment of the problem, considering that the Liar contradiction is false, in line with the tradition of logic of his time. This paper’s discussion shows that specific logical conceptions presupposed in Peirce’s investigation are responsible for the interpretations he provides for the contradiction involved in the paradox. From this discussion, this paper argues that the treatment given to the Liar depends on the background logical conceptions. Thus, the limitations encountered by Peirce in his approaches to the problem are introduced by traditional logic, which, unlike some contemporary logics, does not offer an apparatus compatible with true contradictions.

Modelos científicos

2025-01-23T09:32:49-03:00

Neste artigo vamos trabalhar as condições transcendentais que nos permitem caracterizar um modelo científico como um “diagrama”. Será retomada a noção de diagrama proposta por Ch. S. Peirce (2012) e retomadas as abordagens transcendentais da semiótica perceana para sustentar a função diagramática dos modelos na ciência. Para apoiar esta posição, alguns argumentos da semiótica pragmática e da semiótica transcendental também serão retomados. O objetivo deste artigo é dar conta do problema filosófico do esquematismo transcendental em I. Kant (2007) e da noção de esquema como fundamento do conhecimento.

Peirce and modal logic

2023-08-08T08:17:39-03:00

Although modern modal logic came about largely after Peirce's death, he anticipated some of its key aspects, including strict implication and possible worlds semantics. He developed the Gamma part of Existential Graphs with broken cuts signifying possible falsity, but later identified the need for a Delta part without ever spelling out exactly what he had in mind. An entry in his personal Logic Notebook is a plausible candidate, with heavy lines representing possible states of things where propositions denoted by attached letters would be true, rather than individual subjects to which predicates denoted by attached names are attributed as in the Beta part. New transformation rules implement various commonly employed formal systems of modal logic, which are readily interpreted by defining a possible world as one in which all the relevant laws for the actual world are facts, each world being partially but accurately and adequately described by a closed and consistent model set of propositions. In accordance with pragmaticism, the relevant laws for the actual world are represented as strict implications with real possibilities as their antecedents and conditional necessities as their consequents, corresponding to material implications in every possible world.

Topos of existential graphs over Riemann surfaces

2025-01-27T10:54:21-03:00

Peirce’s Existential Graphs provide a geometrical understanding of a variety of logics (classical, intuitionistic, modal, first-order). The geometrical interpretation is given by topological transformations of closed (Jordan) curves on the plane, but it can be extended to other surfaces (sphere, cylinder, torus, etc.) The result provides the appearance of new logics related to the shapes of the surfaces. Going beyond, one can draw existential graphs over general Riemann Surfaces, and, introducing tools from algebraic geometry (Sheaves, Grothendieck Toposes, Elementary Toposes), one can try to capture both the logics and the geometrical shapes through a new Topos of Existential Graphs over Riemann Surfaces, and through the classifier subobject of the topos. We offer new perspectives (concepts, definitions, examples, conjectures) along this road.