Presentation

Dossier: Peirce and logics

Abstract

This number of the journal Cognitio is dedicated to Charles S. Peirce’s logic. In its broadest sense, logic is understood by Peirce as semiotics, “the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiotics; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer” (EP II, 413). Even in its narrowest sense, taken as a study of the validity of deductive inferences and its components, logic is still too vast. In the middle between these two limits (between generality and particularity) lies a huge variety of continuous topics on logic. The articles collected in this number are precisely samples of that variety and this is the reason why the reader can find here articles that, for instance, are not only dealing with the distinction between collective and general signs, but also with three-valued logic or modal logic.